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Chapter 3
State Employee Pension Plans
Karen Steffen
This chapter explores and evaluates key characteristics of the major state
retirement systems in the United States. Our goal is to offer comparisons
of public and private plans with regard to history, structures, and essential
features.!
u.s. Public and Private Retirement Programs
Since World War II
Pensions in the United States began as a personnel tool to recruit and retain
employees. State and local pension programs began prior to World War II,
during which time many pension programs were based on defined contri-
bution features. However, low investment returns during the first halfof this
century were followed by high inflation after retirement, impelling many
public pensions to move to the defined benefit form. Private sector plans
were uncommon until World War II, when they began to be used to attract
employees during a time of tight labor markets, wage controls and a strong
union influence.
In the private sector, defined benefit (DB) plans 2 remained the norm until
the 1980s, when three major changes in the pension environment made de-
fined contribution (DC) plans more attractive than DB plans. One factor was
the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which estab-
lished complex regulations for private employer retirement programs. By
contrast, public plans remained exempt from many of the ERISA changes
to the IRS tax code, in particular, regarding funding rules (Crane this vol-
ume). Additional changes to ERISA rules in subsequent years made the pri-
vate pension regulatory environment even more complex. The second fac-
tor was booming stock markets, which over the last two decades produced
significant investment gains in pension systems. ERISA funding rules have
restricted the extent to which private employers can make tax-deductible
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contributions to their DB pensions, leading employers to seek other ways
to provide additional benefits and to receive relief from some of the more
complex ERISA requirements. The third factor was a change in the degree
to which corporate America adopted a paternalistic approach to employ-
ees. Corporate downsizing, increased labor mobility, and the end oflifetime
jobs meant that pensions were no longer seen as a deterrent to turnover, but
rather as more of a tax-deferred saving device. The paternalism of the old
DB plan began to give way to the flexibility of the DC pension (Sass 1997).
These developments, and particularly the burgeoning stock market,
boosted the growth of so-called 401(k) plans in the private sector. Public
employers could not offer these plans after 1986, but they were permitted
to offer regular 401(a) DB pensions. In addition, teacher systems may have
403(b) plans as well; these are tax-sheltered annuity plans, not available to
private sector employees. Public employees may also be eligible for deferred
compensation programs under Section 457 of the IRS Code.
Public and Private Pension Plans Today
Over the late 1990's, few private sector employers have established a tra-
ditional defined benefit plan; newer companies tend to have a 401(k) plan
as their sole pension if they offer a plan at all. Older large private em-
ployers tend to have both a traditional, noncontributory defined benefit
program, and also a 401(k) plan for employee contributions and voluntary
supplemental retirement savings. In addition, a pension program known as
a "cash balance" plan is being adopted by many private sector employers
(Rappaport et al. 1997). By contrast, most state and local retirement sys-
tems still maintain a traditional defined benefit plan as their primary pen-
sion plan. Nevertheless, there are some signs of change here too. Recently
a few systems have made the transition to a defined contribution plan, or
have added defined contribution features to their existing defined benefit
program (Fore this volume).
An important difference between private and public retirement programs
today pertains to who pays for the plan. In the public sector, employees
usually are required to contribute toward their DB retirement programs,
generally on a pretax basis (under IRS Code 414[h]), whereas in the pri-
vate sector DB plans are rarely contributory. By contrast, DC plans are more
similar across public and private sectors in that both allow pretax contri-
butions, though the circumstances differ somewhat. For private employees,
401(k) rules allow workers to contribute if they choose to do so on a pretax
basis. In the public sector, regulations are somewhat different. IRS Section
414(h) permits employee contributions to be "picked up" by the employer
and treated as employer contributions for federal tax purposes, but if they
are, the employee no longer has the choice of either receiving the amounts
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directly or as a pretax contribution to the plan. Therefore, all picked-up con-
tributions must be mandatory and of the same amount for all employees.
In this way, employee contributions are treated differently for private and
public DC plans.
As a result of the different employee contribution rules in public plans,
a number of issues arise regarding equity, refund payments, and loss of ac-
crued benefits that tend not to arise in the private plan arena. For instance,
public plans often require employee contributions of at least 25 percent,
but usually less than 50 percent, of total contributions. Many systems ini-
tially required a 50-50 cost split and paid benefits based on accumulated
employee contributions matched with employer funds.3 As benefit improve-
ments were given retroactively, employer contributions tended to rise. Of
course, recent market gains have cut employers' actuarially computed con-
tribution rates and it remains to be seen whether these gains are reflected
only in employer rates (as losses usually are), or whether employee rates are
permitted to fall as well. Most public systems have employee contributions
rates fixed by state statute which cannot be changed except by legislation.4
Private and public plan sector plans also differ in terms of their ability to
change and terminate existing pension programs. ERISA and IRS rules re-
quire private sector employers to guarantee that no employee will lose any
already earned benefit entitlement, but an employer is permitted to modify
or terminate future accruals to both current and new employees. By con-
trast, in the public arena, it is much more difficult-if not impossible-to
change future benefit accruals for existing employees. Thus if changes in a
public retirement program are desired, it might be necessary to permit all
current employees to remain under the current program, and then to apply
the changes in plan design solely to new hires. This commonly leads to two-
tier plans within the same employer group, a rare occurrence in the private
sector.
Another key difference lies in the authority of the fiduciary group that
administers plans across the two sectors. Private sector employers are com-
paratively free to make system changes as long as the proposed change meets
ERISA and IRS requirements. If the plan is subject to collective bargaining,
the union must also be permitted to bargain over changes. Private employ-
ees often have little voice regarding a change in their pension structure. By
contrast, in a governmental plan, changes must generally be approved by
a legislative group, and changes are subject to public disclosures, hearings,
and discussions that accompany the political process. In addition, unions
frequently playa role. For instance, there are thirteen states where only some
employees have bargaining rights, and fourteen states where no bargaining
rights exist; in others, retirement benefits mayor may not be included in
the bargaining process. But even when unions do not directly negotiate over
pensions, these groups can be quite vocal in supporting or opposing pro-
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TABLE 1. Key Differences Between Public and Private Retirement Programs
Features Private plans
Type of main program Combined defined
contribution and
defined benefit
Employee contributions
To primary program No
Mandatory No
To supplemental program Yes
Pretax basis Yes
Covered under ERISA provisions Yes
IRS funding and deductibility concerns Yes
Plan provisions Legal document
prepared by
attorneys
Contributions are expressed as Dollar amounts
Advanced funding of future benefits ERISA required
COLA provisions Rare or ad hoc
Source: Author's compilation.
Public plans
Defined benefit
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Only a few
No
Contained in
legislative statutes
Percentage
of payroll
by state provisions
by state provisions
Common, may be
automatic
posed legislation affecting retirement benefits and pension funding. Table 1
briefly summarizes several of the key differences between private and public
sector retirement programs.
Benefit Features of Public Pension Plans
Despite these differences across public and private sector pension plans, the
plans do share some key attributes. Most importantly, fundamental fund-
ing and design principles apply to all pension systems. Specifically, the cash
flowing into a pension program must come from one of three sources: (1)
contributions, (2) other new money coming in, and (3) net investment re-
turns on assets invested in financial securities. This relationship may be sum-
marized as C + 1= B + E, where C refers to employee and employer contri-
butions and other sources of noninvestment income, I refers to investment
income, B refers to benefit payments, and E refers to fund expenses. Irre-
spective ofwhat type of program is set up, this fundamental formula cannot
be changed. Another way of looking at it is that all monies coming into the
program must eventually be accounted for, and all monies to be paid by a
retirement program must arise from some source.
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What makes retirement programs much different from other entitlement
programs or benefits is the considerable length of time between when the
funds are deposited into the account, and when the benefits are actually paid
out. For a new employee at age 25, benefits earned based on a year of ser-
vice now will not be eligible for payment for up to forty years into the future
at age 65. Then if annual pension payments are made, it may be another
twenty years or more before the pension system is no longer obligated to
make any further payments to the employee or beneficiary. Thus, the aver-
age time horizon for an employee entering a retirement program is gener-
ally at least twenty and often sixty or more years. This period is substantially
longer than the commonly expected "long-term" horizon found, say, in the
area of investments.
Core Benefits
Most benefit obligations promised to members of state retirement systems
are associated with what are known as "core benefits." These refer to the
benefit payable at the normal retirement age, covering work during a lifetime
career with the covered employer group. This normal benefit is usually the
reference for other benefit types, including the early and deferred benefits,
as well as disability, survivor, and postretirement benefits.
Normal benefits. As outlined by Mitchell et al. (this volume), public plan
retirement ages tend to be much younger than age 65; in fact, the public sec-
tor "normal" retirement age is usually age 60 or 62. The age 65 benchmark
has been considered the "normal" retirement age for workers covered by
social security though it was raised for baby boomers under the 1983 amend-
ments. Public plans also tend to provide full "unreduced" benefits based on
service or a combination of age plus service, such that the public employee
may receive full, unreduced retirement benefits after thirty years of service,
for example, regardless ofage (or even as low as after twenty years of service
in some plans; see Mitchell et al. this volume).
A typical benefit formula for normal retirement might equal a member's
number ofyears ofservice times his or her final average salary, times a bene-
fit percentage factor. For example, the Pennsylvania Employee Retirement
System provides 2 percent per year ofservice, such that a member with thirty
years of service and a final average salary of $45,000 would be entitled to a
normal retirement benefit of60 percent of$45,000, or $27,000. Over time,
the percentage factor for public sector plans has risen; thus a 1.5 percent
factor was common twenty years ago, but is rare today. Higher factors are
generally found in public systems where members are not covered by social
security; some 25 percent ofall public plan members today are in this group.
In the public sector, integrated benefit formulas are rare.5
Another factor important in computing normal retirement benefits is the
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averaging period used to determine the salary base to which the percent-
age factor is applied. Until recently, the most commonly used period was
the highest five-year average. This is still the most common averaging period
found in private sector plans. Recent benefit improvements in the public
sector plans now have almost halfof the public plans using a three year aver-
age period and less than a fifth using a five-year period (State of Wisconsin
1996). Some public safety plans base benefits on the final salary without aver-
aging.6 The shorter the period, the more likely a final retirement benefit will
replace net preretirement income; that is, a benefit equal to 50 percent of
average salary provides less than halfof the final salary. Since salaries usually
rise over the worklife, a shorter averaging period increases benefits. In addi-
tion, the shorter the period, the more likely an opportunity for antiselection
arises. This happens when an employee artificially boosts compensation for
the period of time just prior to retirement by working extra hours, taking on
extra duties, etc. This "salary spiking" issue is of concern when determining
the financial cost of providing benefits.
Early benefits. Once the base formula for the normal retirement benefit
has been established, a member can often elect to retire earlier, but perhaps
with a financial penalty. This early benefit tends to be reduced to account
for the fact that the benefit will be paid to the member over a longer period
of time, since payments are starting before the normal retirement age. If
the reduction equals the increase in value for the earlier commencement
of the benefit payments, the reduction is said to be "actuarially equivalent."
Many private plans still require "full" actuarial reduction for early retire-
ment benefits, while others have adopted a step reduction, such as 5 percent
for the first five years ofearly retirement and 8 percent thereafter. If these re-
ductions track the true actuarial reduction benefits are not subsidized; how-
ever smaller reductions create subsidized early retirement benefits. Public
sector plans often provide subsidized early retirement benefit amounts.
Maximum benefits. Public plans may have maximum benefit limitations re-
garding the amount of the benefit to be accrued when expressed as a per-
centage of the final average salary. For example, a plan may pay "full unre-
duced" benefits after thirty years of service, but may prohibit the accrual of
additional benefit credits after thirty years. In such plans, the only increase
for the member's continued employment would be due to the increase in
the average final salary due to pay increases. Such maximum benefit limi-
tations are common in public safety plans, where unreduced benefits are
seen as encouraging earlier retirement in light of the substantial physical
demands for this type of work. It is interesting that some plans continue
to collect employee contributions from members even after they reach the
maximum benefit ceiling as a condition of continued employment.
Post-retirement benefit adjustments. Once retirement occurs and benefits have
begun, they may be changed in recognition of changes in the cost of living.
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Referred to as COLAs, or cost-of-living adjustments, the yearly increases are
usually fixed, such as two percent per year, or may be tied to an outside
index such as the Consumer Price Index. Regular increases are one option,
but many only give "ad-hoc" increases made when a system can afford to
pay for the increased benefits. Nearly all state-level public plans have either
automatic or ad hoc COLAs, whereas less than half ofprivate plans offer
such benefits at all and those that are offered are almost all ad hoc in nature
(Mitchell et al. this volume). The high cost of automatic COLAs, coupled
with employer concerns regarding their ability to consistently provide such
increases on an affordable basis, makes some public systems avoid what may
appear to be a desirable plan feature.
For this reason, some plans undertake occasional benefit improvements
to restore all or a portion of the lost economic value of the benefit due to
inflation. Over time, members retired the longest will have lost the most
purchasing power; these members also tend to be the oldest and therefore
the least expensive candidates for a benefit increase. For this reason, when
a system has a limited budget to improve benefits, a "restoration" COLA is
often popular. There is also a new type ofCOLA adjustment, called the "ex-
cess interest" COLA. It occurs only periodically as with the ad hoc increases,
but it is based on a fixed formula and is then guaranteed to be paid as long
as the formula produces an amount in excess of certain criteria. Another
alternative is illustrated by the Washington State Retirement System, which
recently adopted a "gain-sharing" COLA. Here excess investment returns
were split, providing both increased COLA benefits to retired members and
also reducing the period over which the unfunded pension liability is amor-
tized.
Noncore Benefits
The core benefits discussed above typically cost over three-quarters of the
benefit budget, but several other types of benefits provided by state retire-
ment systems are also worth mentioning.
Deferred vested benefits. Most retirement systems offer some benefits to em-
ployees who no longer work for the employer, but have earned enough cred-
its to receive a retirement benefit. This is known as a deferred or a vested
retirement benefit. ERISA requires private pension plans to provide vested
retirement benefits after a minimum of five years, and there is no way for
an employee to forfeit the vested earned benefit. Public plans differ in two
critical ways when providing for benefits to vested members. One is that
the vesting schedule, which indicates how many years of service the par-
ticipant needs to be fully vested, can be much longer, taking as long as ten
years. Older uniformed systems may even require full career service, such
as twenty years, not granting any retirement benefit for termination prior
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to that time. Second, public employees leaving employment may elect to
forfeit earned benefit rights by withdrawing their contributions when they
leave, a practice known as a "refund." Sometimes a provision may be made
for the member to restore his lost accrued benefit by repaying the refund
amount with interest if he or she subsequently becomes reemployed and
covered by the same retirement system.
Depending on the age and years of service of the member at the time of
termination, the value of the accrued vested benefit in current dollars (the
present value of the deferred benefit) may be less than the total dollars, plus
interest, contributed by the member prior to termination of employment.
Thus, any employer dollars contributed while the member was working may
not necessarily add to the value of that particular member's earned benefit,
but may be assigned to other members for purposes of benefit payments.
This practice of benefit assignment within a DB plan gives rise to substantial
misunderstanding in the public arena, and provides some impetus for the
current trend toward DC plans in the public sector.
Death benefits. Nearly all state retirement systems provide for some type of
benefit upon death while in active service. This benefit often takes the form
of the benefit the member's spouse or beneficiary might have received had
the member retired just prior to death. This is similar to the ERISA/REA
(Retirement Equity Act) required benefits for private plans.
Disability benefits. Many, but not all, public plans provide retirement bene-
fits payable if the member is disabled and no longer able to continue work-
ing. These disability benefits are usually related to the normal accrued re-
tirement benefit, but can use a lower benefit percentage factor in computing
the benefit, say 1.50 percent when the normal formula uses 2 percent. Some
systems actually provide a subsidized benefit to disabled members, at least
over the period that the member would have otherwise been working. In
practice, disability benefits are often geared to replace some fraction of a
member's income (e.g., 60 percent of average compensation) or provide a
benefit equal to what the member would have earned had employment con-
tinued and the member had earned the full number of years of service to
the normal retirement age. Some public systems have recently contemplated
eliminating the disability benefit from their retirement system, instead pro-
viding this form of insurance outside the system. The financial impact of
this can vary by system and may depend on whether or not the retirement
agency is able to administer the program (deciding who qualifies for and
meets the definitions ofdisablement to receive the benefit). Outsourcing the
benefit determination process may occur with a third-party administrator,
where the retirement system continues to pay benefits. This approach keeps
disability benefit financing within the system but reduces the sometimes-
difficult fiduciary issues that arise when reviewing individual situations.
Disability benefits are usually coordinated with worker's compensation
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and social security payments, in both the public and private sectors. Duty-
related benefits may not require a service requirement, but non-duty related
benefits may require five or ten years of employment, as well as satisfaction
of the definition of disablement. The definition of disablement can vary,
from disablement from any type ofgainful employment to only disablement
from the employee's own occupation. More disability benefits are paid to
public safety officers than to other public employees. One reason may be
the hazardous nature of the job, plus some duty-disability benefits payable
to public safety members may be excludable from those individuals' taxable
federal income. This may lead to an incentive to provide benefits under the
disability rules rather than as a normal service retirement.
optionalforms ofpayments. Regular retirement benefits are usually payable
as a monthly annuity, starting at retirement and stopping upon the mem-
ber's death with no further payments to be made, regardless if death occurs
one month or thirty years after retirement. Optional forms of payment are
frequently available, usually set to be actuarially equivalent to the system's
regular retirement benefit. Unisex factors are required by law, and simpli-
fied factors that reflect the overall actuarial values may be used. The monthly
amount for an optional benefit is generally lower than for the regular bene-
fit, to account for the financial impact of potentially greater total benefit
payments paid by the retirement system due to the option's features. With
the exception of the pop-upjoint and survivor options, all options are found
in both the private and the public sector.
Guaranteed payments. This form of benefit affords some type of guarantee
to the member that a minimum number of benefit payments will be made;
the larger the guarantee, the greater the reduction from the regular form of
payment. There are two common types of guarantees: a period certain, and
a refund annuity. Turning first to the period certain form, this ensures that
a total number of benefit payments is guaranteed, regardless of when the
member dies. If the member dies before all guaranteed payments have been
made, the same monthly benefit amount will continue to a beneficiary until
all guaranteed payments have been made to the member prior to death, or
subsequently to the beneficiary. If the member lives beyond the guaranteed
period, the monthly benefit payments usually continue until death.7
The refund annuity form is found in contributory retirement plans, and
it guarantees that a member's accumulated contributions are repaid with
interest, determined at time of retirement. The difference, if any, between
the benefits paid and the guaranteed amount, is payable upon the mem-
ber's death, either as a lump sum or as continued monthly payments to a
beneficiary. When the total benefit payments equals the accumulated contri-
butions with interest, the form is known as the refund annuity; this feature
may be built into the normal form of payment for some public contribu-
tory plans and ensures that the amount payable upon death is an employer
50 Karen Steffen
paid death benefit, rather than an optional form of payment with a reduced
benefit. By contrast, if the employee-purchased portion (the annuity por-
tion) of the sum of the total benefit payments is guaranteed to equal the
accumulated contributions with interest, the form is known as the modified
refund annuity form of payment.
Continuation to a survivor. These options ensure that if a named beneficiary
is still living upon a member's death, the reduced benefit (or a portion of
it) is paid to the beneficiary for the remainder of the beneficiary's lifetime.
The beneficiary may be limited to only the spouse. This form of payment is
called a joint and survivor form of payment, with the portion of the continua-
tion commonly included in the name, such as a joint and 50 percent survivor
option. A less common form of payment reduces upon the first death of
either the member or the beneficiary. A different form, called the joint and
survivor with pop-up, has become popular of late in public retirement plans.
This is a variation of the joint and survivor form of payment. Under the pop-
up option, if the beneficiary dies before the member, the member's benefit
payment pops up to what it would have been had the member not elected
the joint and survivor feature. Under the normal joint and survivor option,
the member elects a reduced monthly benefit in order to provide protection
to a beneficiary. When the beneficiary dies before the member, the protec-
tion is of no further value, yet the member's benefit is still reduced. In a
sense, the member has paid for something that will not be received. Under
the pop-up version, the member's benefit is restored once the protection
is no longer needed. The reduction for the joint and survivor with pop-up
option is greater than for the normal joint and survivor option, again to
cover the financial cost ofproviding additional benefits. In a few systems, the
benefit pops up upon divorce as well as upon the beneficiary's death. One
variant found in the public sector (but rarely in the private sector) permits
a retiree to direct survivor benefits to a new beneficiary upon remarriage.
Level income option. This option allows a member who retires prior to the
normal social security age (SSA) to receive retirement benefits that are mod-
ified so that the combined income from the retirement system and from so-
cial security remains level throughout the member's lifetime. This means the
pension system's payments are higher before social security payments begin,
and they fall after social security begins. Depending on the retirement and
the estimated social security benefit payment, it is possible that no retire-
ment benefits would be payable after social security begins. Although the
theory is that the member's income stream will be level, often it proves not
to be in practice. This is because social security, and often the pension sys-
tem as well, makes postretirement adjustments that upset the original "level-
ing out" feature of this option. This option is sometimes combined with the
features of a guaranteed payment or a continuation to survivor form of pay-
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ment. It may be feasible, within certain tax limitations, to provide a similar
modified payment stream that is not dependent on expected social security
payments.
DROP plans. "Deferred retirement option plans," or DROPs, refer to a
public plan feature where members are allowed to effectively begin receiving
retirement payments while remaining on the job.8 These plans originated
in fire and police plans where members could retire with full benefits at a
comparatively young age, say after twenty years of service. Many cities could
not afford to lose the experience and training of these seasoned officers and
used the DROP programs to entice members to continue working.
These plans are relatively new and raise many concerns that include tax
consequences to the member, benefit limitations under Section 415, and
higher marginal tax rates that may apply to the pension payments. Bene-
fit consultants tend to recommend that a private letter ruling be requested
from the IRS before implementing any specific DROP plan. The DROP
option is especially attractive if the system provides for no additional accru-
als after twenty years of service, and they provide public employers with the
ability to predict with more accuracy future employment vacancies. Under
a DROP plan, a member who would otherwise be eligible to retire and com-
mence benefit payments, instead "freezes" the amount of retirement bene-
fit payable and then continues to work in active employment. The benefit
payments that would have been made instead accumulate in a tax-qualified
fund accumulating interest (and sometimes additional member contribu-
tions). At actual retirement, the previously frozen monthly benefit payments
are then paid to the member rather than to the accumulated fund account,
and the member receives the accumulated fund balance as a lump-sum pay-
ment. Members like the advantages of receiving the lump sum payment at
time of retirement. When a member elects to participate in the DROP, for
purposes of the retirement plan, she or he is considered to have retired.
But for all other employment purposes the member continues working and
receiving a salary and full nonretirement benefits. The amount of the mem-
ber's monthly retirement payment is frozen based on final compensation
and service credits determined as of the date the DROP option is elected.
The member continues to work while the DROP is in effect, but the con-
tinued employment has no effect on the amount of the member's retirement
benefit.
At first glance it may appear that no financial cost is associated with this
type ofplan, since the system would have been making the payments had the
member actually retired from service, the cost could range from no cost to
I percent or more ofpay. A number ofdifferent features and issues can affect
whether this option is actually cost-neutral for the public system. In addi-
tion to the benefit features mentioned above, other factors affecting whether
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to offer a DROP include its impact on member beneficiaries, the desire to
have members continue working longer, the complexity of the program, and
whether other benefit improvements are more desirable.
Postretirement health benefit plans. Few public plans provide postretirement
health benefits, but several have set up financial systems where some type of
benefit is available to offset the cost of the insurance premiums for retired
members. For example, both Wisconsin and Idaho provide for unused sick
leave to be credited to an account at retirement, which is then used to pay
for the employee's health premiums after retirement. However, once the ac-
count is depleted, the member must make premium payments from another
source-usually from the monthly retirement benefit payment.
Reemployment after retirement. Many public sector retirement systems termi-
nate or stop making payments to retired members if they return to work after
retirement. Returning to work within the same retirement program may
occur in the public sector for several reasons. First, government workers
may have an experience base, which makes them more attractive to call
back rather than hiring a new employee. Second, public members can re-
tire earlier than private sector employees, so there is a greater potential for
reentry into the workforce.
Portability. The concept of portable benefits has become an attractive goal
for both private and public plans, and the advent of individual retirement
accounts (IRAs) has greatly enhanced the portability of DC benefits. How-
ever, in the DB arena, few private sector plan participants can shift their
assets or benefits across plans. By contrast, public sector plans have made
some progress in permitting DB plan mobility.
One reason that portability has been seen as a problem in DB plans has
to do with the benefit formula: vested accrued benefits depend on the final
average salary at the time of termination, yet if an employee moves around
and has several accrued DB benefits, the total of all vested benefits is much
less than if the benefits had all been earned under one system (Fore, this
volume). If true DB portability were to occur, the final average salary used
for all vested benefits would have to be based on the final compensation
at the last employer, which in turn boosts the value of the vested benefits
left with the prior employers. A method of approaching this problem in the
public sector is permitting employees to purchase "service credits" as they
enter a new system, thus raising benefits payable by the new employer. This
provision may require a mobile public sector employee to deposit employee
contributions (or both employee and employer contributions) that the new
system would have made on behalf of the member for the period of time
the service was earned with the prior employer. Less often, a public plan
allows service to be purchased based on employment with a previous non-
governmental employer; such purchases not directly related to prior service
are called "permissive service credits."
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Even with these "past contributions," it is unlikely the additional contri-
butions will be sufficient to cover the increased value of the benefits because
most members do not make such contributions unless it is to their financial
advantage to do so. Also, because of the generous early retirement provi-
sions in public plans, additional years of "purchased" service increase, not
only the amount of the benefit to be paid, but the value of the entire early
retirement benefit. Thus, the true cost to the system for the purchase of
additional service needs to cover both the cost of the increased benefit di-
rectly attributable to the additional service and the cost ofpaying the benefit
accrued without the additional service at an earlier age. This type of porta-
bility of benefits in the public sector is most commonly found among teacher
plans on a state plan basis and plans within a local area. For instance, the
Washington State Retirement Systems provide portability of service credits
for determining retirement eligibility but not for benefit amounts between
the major city retirement systems within the state.
The Legal Basis of Public Retirement Systems
A public plan is established and modified through the legislating body and
approved, if necessary, by the executive. For a state retirement system, this
is the state legislature and governor. The retirement plan documents, which
contain all the provisions of the program, are included in complete de-
tail within the state's legal statutes. The pension program is usually imple-
mented and administered by a public agency and governing board.
Federal constraints: ERISA. Compared to private plans, fewer limitations are
placed on public plans.9 Except for the IRS qualification rules, members of
public plans were exempted from the legal protection afforded to private
plans under ERISA. Much of this relates back to the constitutional issue
of states' rights and the ability of the federal government to place limits
or restrictions on a state's activities. At the time ERISA was drafted, it was
uncertain as to what impact the new law would have on public plans. The
main concern for a state retirement system is to be able to retain its quali-
fied plan status under the IRS code. lO Without the qualification status, both
the employer and the employee could incur undesirable tax liabilities. Gen-
eral nondiscrimination requirements has limited some plan design features,
where it may be of interest to provide a higher or special benefit to only
a selected group of employees such as judges or legislators. As long as no
discrimination (higher benefits) is made toward the highly compensated
groups, there are not many restrictions as to the ability to provide different
benefits to, say, teachers, than to general government employees.
Federal constraints: contract rights. While public plan members may not have
the rigorously defined protection of ERISA rules, the courts have served to
define a much higher degree of protection in certain states. Commonly re-
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ferred to as the contract rights protection, several state supreme courts have
ruled that, due to a federal constitutional standard relating to contracts,
the public employer is prevented from modifying the pension promise. Ap-
proximately half of the states have either a state constitutional provision or
a statutory provision describing this contract right, or have past court cases
that have inferred the existence of a contract with respect to the retirement
program, and thus coverage under the U.S. Constitution. In the remaining
states, the characterization of the pension benefits right as a contract is not
well defined, or may have been rejected.
It should be noted that the promise is what cannot be modified or dimin-
ished. This means any employee hired under a retirement program has the
right to earn benefits under the promise for as long as his/her employment
continues. Clause 1, Article 1, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution limits cer-
tain state powers; among these, the section provides: "No state shall ... pass
any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts." Retirement system bene-
fits have been interpreted as being under this contract concept. Thus, if any
significant changes are to occur in a public pension plan, they usually re-
sult in a new layer of benefits applicable only to new hires, or to existing
employees solely on a voluntary basis. Generally, "significant change" is in-
terpreted to mean any reduction in future accruals, elimination of optional
forms or otherwise to modify existing benefits rights without an offsetting
comparable advantage.
In 1995, the Retirement Board of the Kentucky Employees Retirement
System sued to try to force the General Assembly to mandate the amount
of the state's contribution to the plan, and to set the contribution rate as
recommended by the board based on an actuarial valuation. Their case was
based on the impairment of contract theory. The Kentucky Supreme Court
rejected the position that the budget bill adopted and set by the state im-
paired the members' benefit rights. The court acknowledged that the mem-
bers had a contractual right to the benefits they were promised upon retire-
ment, but there had been no showing that the benefits promised would be
infringed by the General Assembly's failure to adopt the board's contribu-
tion recommendations.
Federal constraints: excess benefit plans. Public plans are restricted as to the
size of the benefit payable by the plan, by the IRS maximum benefit limits
under Code Section 415. Public plans have always had special Section 415
provisions that differed from those applied to private plans. Except in a few
situations, the limitations allow higher benefits than what the private sector
plans can provide. The Small BusinessJob Protection Act of 1996 permitted
for the first time, a public agency to pay benefits in excess of the 415 limits
by establishing an "excess benefit plan." Private sector employers have had
this ability for quite some time.
The former Section 415 limits of 100 percent of the three-year average
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compensation were eliminated for public plans in the same act. Now, only
the §415 limitations for defined benefit plans remain. The maximum per-
mitted annual benefit for 1999 is $130,000 at age 62, an amount unlikely to
impact very many government-paid employees. The dollar limitation does
reduce for earlier retirement ages, but the most common group that used to
bump into the limitation was the public safety group, where full unreduced
retirement is available as early as age 45 under a 20-year and out provision.ll
However, after 1996, no reduction is made in the $130,000 limitation for
public safety members, regardless of age. But some public plans found that
the §415 limits would not permit them to provide the full benefit required
under their plan provisions (state statutes), and sought federal reliefwhich
was granted by permitting public plans to elect a special grandfather provi-
sion, protecting benefits for current members, but only if they applied the
lower private sector §415 limits to all new hires in the governmental plan.
Public policy influence. The political atmosphere in which governmental
plans operate is another aspect of plan design that private plans rarely deal
with. As with any legislative process, a well-informed group of individuals
can propose and promote changes in public retirement policies, which may
or may not lead to change.
Sometimes proposed changes in the public sector come from special in-
terest groups rather than as a suggestion or recommendation from the ad-
ministrative staff or the retirement board. On the other hand, the retire-
ment board may not be in a position to recommend any changes unless they
are administrative in nature. In that case, the larger issue of plan design and
adequacy is left to the legislative change process. It is for this reason that
many plan changes are backed by special lobbying groups, often represent-
ing employees or retirees, which results in the plan design evolving based
on employee requests rather than from employer needs. This rarely occurs
in the private sector, except for negotiated plans.
Of course, as with private sector plans, changes usually come with an as-
sociated price tag. Employer groups or the states themselves may not be
in a position to accept the financial cost of the proposed changes. Any in-
crease in benefits will lead to a corresponding increase in costs because of
the formula introduced above, namely, C+1= B +E. Higher benefits increase
contributions. This is sometimes overlooked when what may seem like a rea-
sonable but small adjustment to the system at present, can later result in
a significant increase in costs over the long term for all future employees.
This is particularly of concern in the DB arena for two reasons. In a defined
benefit plan, an increase in contributions impacts not only the current fis-
cal budget but all future years' budgets as well. This long-term impact can
sometimes be overlooked or given less weight, with elected officials who do
not look much farther than the end of their term or the next election. And
where private plan SpOnSOl"S can change their minds if finances are lacking
56 Karen Steffen
to support increased benefits, public plans rarely can reduce benefits. And
because increased pension spending must come from constituent tax dol-
lars, solving pension problems by raising contributions is generally seen as
a result to be avoided if possible.
Public Pension Plan Administration
Public retirement programs are administered via governmental agencies
that are typically independent ofother agencies.The fiduciary responsibility
for the program's administration is held by a board. The board is made up of
elected, appointed and ex-officio members, and it manages the retirement
program (see Useem and Hess this volume). The board usually has control
over the investment policy and the actuarial assumptions. It hires the execu-
tive director, and perhaps other key staff, who in turn manages the agency
staff that performs the tasks needed to administer the retirement benefits.
The board may establish rules for the administration and operations of the
retirement system, will approve all expenditures of the system, and have re-
ports prepared and submitted to meet legal and other requirements. The
retirement board is also the body that selects consultants and retirement
staff. These include investment advisors and managers, legal and actuarial
professionals, and medical advisors to assist in determining disability bene-
fits. There have been some recent concerns expressed over real or perceived
conflicts between retirement board members and vendors working for the
system. Some states have implemented very strict rules on what board mem-
bers and staff members may be able to accept in the form of meals and travel
or other gifts from both existing and potential vendors. On the reverse side,
some board members have solicited political contributions from vendors,
implying support may be withheld to continue the vendor relationship, if
contributions are not made.
Public Pension Plan Funding
Sources ofincome. Public retirement systems are financed by employer and em-
ployee contributions. As mentioned earlier, it is rare for employees to con-
tribute to a private sector defined benefit plan, but in a state plan, the state
may contribute not only for its own employees, but may also make a contri-
bution toward the benefits ofother non-state employees such as teachers. In
that situation, the teachers' benefits may be supported from their contribu-
tions, the school district's contributions to the state retirement system, and
the state's contributions to the retirement system. Public sector plan con-
tributions are usually expressed as a percentage of salary rather than as a
dollar amount, as is usual in private pension plans.
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) rules require an ac-
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tuarial valuation of public pension funding status every two years, after
which required contribution targets are set as either a fixed rate or a variable
rate, based on the results of the actuarial valuation. When a system has both
fixed benefits (a defined benefit program) and fixed contribution rates, the
flexibility and recognition of experience fluctuations from year to year is
usually absorbed by varying the length of time needed to pay for the bene-
fit obligations. Employee contribution rates are fixed or may be tied to the
employer contribution rate.
In addition to contributions, some public pension plans receive income
from fees or earmarked levies. For example, judges' retirement benefits may
be funded by a portion of the court filing fees. Some firefighter programs
receive a portion of their income from fire insurance premiums received
by the state. In such cases, income expressed as a percentage of salary is
not a reliable measurement, as the source of those funds is not related to
employee salaries.
Funding methods and assumptions. An actuarial valuation is performed to
determine the funding adequacy of a defined benefit retirement program.
In a defined contribution plan, the benefits are dependent on the contribu-
tions and the investment income, so there is no need to determine funding
adequacy (in a DC program funding is the contribution; for more detail see
Hustead this volume).
For a defined benefit program, the sponsor needs to be sure that the con-
tributions and investment income will be sufficient to pay the benefits that
have been promised. If this year's contributions exceed the benefits and ex-
penses for this year, then the excess contributions can be retained in the
plan's fund for future benefit payments. If no excess occurs and the cash
inflow is only sufficient to cover the cash outgo, then the plan is said to be
funded on a "pay-as-you-go basis." If an excess occurs and is invested, then
additional income is derived from assets through investment return. If the
excess contributions are computed to be sufficient to create enough assets
to provide for benefits in the future, then the plan is advance funded. Nearly
all public retirement programs are advance funded. However, a few supple-
mental benefits may be funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. Private plans under
ERISA are required to be advance funded.
The most common advance funding method used in state retirement pro-
grams is the "entry age cost method." 12 Under this method, the actuarial
present value of the projected benefits of each individual included in the
valuation is allocated as a level percentage of the individual's projected com-
pensation between entry age and assumed exit. The portion of this actu-
arial present value allocated to a valuation year is called the "normal cost."
The portion of this actuarial present value not provided for at a valuation
date by the sum of (a) the actuarial value of the assets and (b) the actuarial
present value of future normal costs, is called the "unfunded actuariallia-
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bility." The unfunded actuarial liability is amortized as a level percentage of
the projected salaries of present and future members of the system. Under
this method, contributions expressed as a percentage ofsalary, are expected
to remain stable over time, from one generation of taxpayers to another.
PENDAT (1997) reports that 63 percent of the reporting public plans used
the entry age cost method.
When both benefits and contribution rates are fixed, the entry age cost
method allows for the experience fluctuations to be reflected in the amorti-
zation period required to fund the unfunded actuarial liability. Another cost
method, the "aggregate cost method," allocates the present value of bene-
fits not already funded by the current actuarial assets, over the expected
working lives of the active members, which is usually between ten and fif-
teen years. Under this method, the contribution rates vary, reflecting the
experience of the system since the last valuation. Another method used less
in the public than in the private sector, is the "projected unit credit method."
.Under this funding method, the projected benefit is allocated to each valua-
tion year by a consistent formula. Under this method the experience gains
and losses reduce the unfunded actuarial liability.
Actuarial assumptions are used to project the value of benefits that will
be paid in the future to active members upon their retirement, as well as
how long the benefits currently being paid to retired members will con-
tinue. The economic assumptions regarding the future investment income
and future salary increases can produce the greatest variation in results. The
assumptions related to the movement ofemployees in and out of the system,
the demographic assumptions, are dependent on the particular system and
will not be based on as much subjectivity as are the economic assumptions.
Usually, an actuarial valuation makes no projection of benefits for future
employees, but focuses on the liabilities associated only with the current
employees and annuitants. Those employees are assumed to then terminate
employment, retire, die, or become disabled. In addition, the actuary must
assume at what rate the members' salaries will increase, what postretirement
increases to benefits will be, if any, and perhaps the probabilities of mar-
riage or having dependent children. All of these assumptions are common
in a private pension plan valuation as well as a public plan valuation.
One assumption related to a contributory plan is the probability a termi-
nating member will elect a refund of his or her contributions, and thereby
forfeit any rights to any accrued retirement benefits. Since private plans are
not contributory, this assumption is somewhat unique to public plans. If a
private sector plan did require employee contributions, ERISA requirement
would guarantee some minimal employer paid benefit payment.
Another assumption more commonly found for public than for private
plans has to do with the expanded retirement assumption. Since public
plans often provide unreduced benefits at more than one retirement age,
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or offer subsidized early retirement benefits at younger ages, there may be
more than one retirement age at which a member can be expected to retire.
A greater degree of flexibility and variation in the retirement patterns is ex-
perienced in the public sector. The private sector does not see as much of
this, as their reduced benefits may be closer to the actuarial equivalent of
the benefit paid at the normal retirement age.
The economic assumptions, the future rate of investment earnings and
the expected salary increases for both individual members and the total
covered payrOll of the system have an important impact on the valuation of
the costs and liabilities for a system. Assumptions should not be considered
independently of each other, but viewed together as a group. The interrela-
tionship of assumptions should be consistent, particularly with respect to
economic assumptions. ERISA and professional standards require all actu-
aries to use assumptions that are reasonable and which represent the actu-
ary's best estimate of anticipated experience.
Accounting disclosures-GASB requirements. For fiscal years beginning after
mid-1996, new GASB reporting standards have been required for defined
benefit pension plans reporting and disclosures. Statement no. 25 estab-
lishes standards for the measurement, recognition and display of pension
expenditure/expense and related liabilities, assets, note disclosure, and, if
applicable, required supplementary information in the financial reports of
state and local governmental employers.
The requirements for Statement no. 25 include certain supplementary
information to the financial statements regarding the funding of the pen-
sion plan. These include a schedule of funding progress, and a schedule
of employer contributions. The schedule of funding progress compares the
amount of unfunded actuarial liability (UAL) from year to year, and mea-
sures the progress of the employer's contributions in reducing this amount.
Under most acceptable funding methods there is a UAL, however, under the
aggregate actuarial cost method there is no UAL and a schedule of funding
progress is not needed. The required schedule of employer contributions
compares the employer contributions required based on the actuarial re-
quired contribution, or ARC, with employer contributions actually made.
GASB Statement No. 27 is effective for fiscal years beginning after mid-
1997, and it is required for pension accounting by state and local govern-
mental employers. The disclosures include the measurement of an annual
pension cost (APC). The APC is equal to the employer's annual required con-
tributions (ARCs), as actuarially determined by the funding methods and
assumptions for pension benefits used for GASB purposes and an adjust-
ment to account for prior year contributions. If the employer is required to
make a contribution (APC) and does not make a contribution equal to the
APC, then a net pension obligation (NPO) account is established and the
computation of the APC reflects adjustments made to the NPO account, as
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well as the ARC. For GASB purposes, the ARC must be calculated based on
certain parameters required for disclosure purposes. The acceptable actu-
arial funding methods under these parameters all require the retirement
benefits to be funded by the time a member exits the retirement program.
Actual employer contributions based on a plan's funding policy may be dif-
ferent than those computed for GASB disclosure purposes, and the deter-
mination of the NPO at the end of the year should be determined based on
the actual amounts received by the fund.
The VAL and the percentage funded by the actuarial value of the assets is
shown in the schedule of funding progress, as well as the VAL expressed as
a percentage of payroll. The schedule of employer contributions compares
the ARC to the contribution amount received by the plan's fund for the plan
year. Additional disclosures regarding the actuarial assumptions and meth-
ods and other items ofsignificance are also required by Statement no. 25 for
the plan's reporting.
Statement no. 27 reports on the employer'S required contributions and
the funded status of the plan. Notes to the employer's financial statements
include the plan description and the funding policy. Except for cost-sharing
plans, the disclosures also require a development of the APC and the NPO
balance for the year, and a comparison of the actual employer contributions
made to the APC for the last three years. Thus the changes in a plan's NPO
balance from year to year can be used to measure whether or not a plan's
funding status has either improved or declined during the period reported,
based on the GASB parameters.
As a result of these accounting standards, two new funding measurements
are now available for those reviewing a public plan's funding status. First, the
funding ratio (the ratio of the actuarial assets to the VAL) is being used more
and more as a funding measurement tool. Second, the NPO balance, while
not as common, can also be monitored. Since most statewide pension plans
are cost sharing plans, where all benefit costs are pooled among a group of
employers, the APC and NPO computations are not required, and do not re-
sult in a uniform measurement tool. A plan is not a cost sharing plan if there
is a single employer sponsor, or if under a pooled investment arrangement
each employer has its share of the assets allocated to and its own pension
costs determined separately from the other employers (nonshared).
Measurement offunding status. Regardless of the GASB reporting, consider-
ation should always be given to how well a plan is following its own funding
policy. Many state plans have funding requirements or minimum jmaximum
contribution rates. For example, a plan's funding policy may be to achieve
a one-year reduction in the amortization period of the VAL. This is what
would be expected to occur if actual experience is close to the actuarially
expected experience. Almost always, the actual experience will be differ-
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ent than assumed. The treatment of these differences between actual and
expected experiences should be addressed in the funding policy. If the con-
tribution rates are fixed, the only acceptable method is to adjust the amor-
tization period of the UAL. However, the funding policy or state statute
may require that while fixed contribution rates are desired, if the amortiza-
tion period exceeds a certain period, say, thirty years, then the rates must
be increased. Likewise, if the contribution rates reflect the experience, the
funding policy will usually require the UAL to be measured over a certain
period in determining how to adjust the contribution rates to reflect the
changes.
Pension obligation bOJU.is. A pension obligation bond is a debt instrument
sold by a governmental employer for a special pension related purpose as
in the New Jersey case discussed elsewhere in this volume (Bryan, this vol-
ume). Usually, the proceeds of the bond are used by the employer to fund
all or a portion of the UAL for the pension plan. In return for using the
proceeds to fund the UAL, the employer may have some special funding
agreements put into place to recognize the large deposit of funds into the
plan's assets. Usually, this arrangement will make a modification to the UAL
contributions otherwise payable by the employer, and will recognize a por-
tion of the investment return on the plan's funds as an additional means of
income to meet future required employer contributions. The gain or loss to
the employer or the pension plan benefit depends on the level of future in-
vestment returns. These arrangements are favorable to the employer when
the rate on the bond debt is less than the discount rate used to determine
the pension plan's UAL payments. But these cost savings can only be esti-
mated, because the future investment returns on the plan's assets cannot
be fixed. There is also the risk that the UAL may reoccur or increase due
to future benefit increases, higher than expected inflation, lower actual in-
vestment returns, and other factors. A certain amount of flexibility is also
lost since the debt payments are fixed, whereas the pension payments may
be adjusted. The cost of issuing the bonds must also be considered. These
bonds have been issued by relatively few public sector employers.
Caution is needed to avoid the appearance of arbitrage, which can lead
to unfavorable tax treatment by the IRS, when compared to other govern-
mental bonds. Some states may prohibit the issuance ofa pension obligation
bond. Another consideration is if the actuarial assumptions change over
the period of the bond debt, which is likely over a period of time, will the
changes adversely impact the decision to issue a pension obligation bond?
In recent years, the market returns have caused a number of public plans to
become fully funded, meaning the actuarial assets now exceed the accrued
liabilities and no UAL remains. Thus, interest in these funding vehicles has
decreased in popularity.
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Investment Policy
The investment policy of any particular public pension plan generally de-
pends on what the plan's objectives are, what if any statutory restrictions
exist, and how much control the board has over the funds' investment de-
cisions (see Peskin, this volume). Typically a public plan board has a fairly
broad policy, based on reasonable investments given the fiduciary nature of
the plan to its members. Certain states have statutes limiting the amount of
the total fund assets that may be invested in equities or nontraditional invest-
ments such as venture capital (Munnell and Sunden, this volume). However,
some state plans have all investment decisions handled by either a separate
investment board, which may invest other state funds as well as the pension
funds, or by a single trustee - the state treasurer or similar elected position.
The resulting investment policy can vary depending on who actually makes
the investment decisions.
Where the retirement board has full exclusive authority on making invest-
ments, within any statutory limitations, the political pressure from within
government may be somewhat reduced if the same governmental official is
also a fiduciary to the pension plan. In times of financial distress, state and
local governments have been known to look to the public pension fund as a
source of relief. This may come in the form of less than the recommended
contributions, thus decreasing the funds to the pension plans and freeing
up more governmental funds for what are seen as more important needs.
This situation has less immediate impact due to the long term nature of pen-
sions than, say, reducing a public service that is required on a regular basis
today. In most cases, the lowering of contributions now would not impact
the actual payment of members benefit payments until far into the future.
The new GASB reporting rules serve to focus and highlight wherever an em-
ployer might be using this approach.
Another sometimes politically motivated approach is to have the pen-
sion plan's trust fund invest in government securities. One such example is
described by Clark et al. (this volume); another example occurred during
the late 1970s when the New York State legislature attempted to have the
trustees invest in New York City bonds. This direct approach has not been
seen much during the past decade. More recently economically targeted in-
vestments have been used, as described by Useem and Hess (this volume)
and Munnell and Sunden (this volume).
Conclusion
In this chapter we have described U.S. state and local public pension sys-
tems and compared them to private plans with regard to history, structures,
and key features. There are many similarities between private and public
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sector retirement programs, but the significant differences also need to be
recognized. On the one hand, the ultimate goal in both cases is to provide
a retirement benefit. On the other hand, public plans have unique and un-
usual characteristics that can make analogies to private plans incomplete.
Plan design features that perform essential functions for private sector plans
do not always apply to the public sector.
Notes
1. In this chapter we offer certain generalizations with the understanding that
there are always many exceptions to the rule. We note important exceptions where
relevant.
2. A defined benefit plan is one where the benefit provided by the retirement pro-
gram is a definitely determinable benefit, usually a lifetime annuity based on a for-
mula using years of service and salary.
3. A tabulation ofpublic service retirement plans indicates most pension formulas
were based on an annuity from employee accumulated contributions and a match-
ing pension amount funded by employer contributions, with some type of minimum
or maximum benefit (1928 Seattle Public Library, Municipal Reference Division).
4. A recent survey by CalPERS indicated 17 of 66 responding public retirement
systems have contribution rates set by state statute.
5. The integration of benefits allows employers to recognize the level of benefit
earned under the social security program and provides a greater amount to higher
paid employees, such that the combined benefits are level. A significant number of
private plans still have integrated formulas but the fraction is declining due to recent
changes in IRS compliance rules.
6. The term "public safety members" generally refers to police and fire employ-
ees, but may include other employees considered to be employed in hazardous duty
types of employment and can sometimes include prison guards or other uniformed
officers.
7. In a form rarely used, benefit payments cease once the guaranteed number
of payments have been made, even if the member is still living. This is known as a
"period certain only" form of payment.
8. Private pension plans are subject to certain ERISA provisions that make DROPs
less attractive than in the public sector.
9. A discussion offederal legal and tax limitations on governmental plans appears
in Crane (this volume).
10. A tax qualified plan is one that has meet all the applicable requirements oflRS
Section 401(a) and is permitted to defer taxation of the accrual of benefits for em-
ployees and to exempt the fund's investment income from U.S. tax. One such quali-
fication requirement is that the benefits do not discriminate in favor of the highly
compensated employees IRS Code Section 401(a)(4).
II. When an employee is eligible to retire regardless of age, but dependent only
on the number of years of service earned, for example, twenty years, the retirement
eligibility is sometimes referred to as a "twenty year and out" retirement provision.
12. A method under which the actuarial present value of the projected benefits of
each individual included in an actuarial valuation is allocated on a level basis over
the earnings or service of the individual between entry age and assumed exit age(s).
The portion of this actuarial present value allocated to a valuation year is called the
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normal cost. The portion of this actuarial present value not provided for at a valua-
tion date by the actuarial present value of future normal costs is called the actuarial
accrued liability. See GASB (1994). The description of this method should state the
procedures, including whether the allocation is based on earnings or service; where
aggregation is used in the calculation process; how entry age is established; what
procedures are used when different benefit formulas apply to various periods of ser-
vice; and a description of any other method used to value a portion of the pension
plan's benefits. Under this method, the actuarial gains (Losses), as they occur, reduce
(increase) the unfunded actuarial accrued liability.
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